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This paper looks at the relationship between spacetime functionalism and
Harvey Brown’s dynamical relativity. One popular way of reading and ex-
tending Brown’s programme in the literature rests on viewing his position
as a version of relationism. But a kind of spacetime functionalism extends
the project in a different way, by focussing on the account Brown gives of
the role of spacetime in relativistic theories. It is then possible to see this
as giving a functional account of the concept of spacetime which may be
applied to theories that go beyond relativity. This paper explores the way
in which both the relationist project and the functionalist project relate to
Brown’s work, despite being incompatible. Ultimately, these should not be
seen as two conflicting readings of Brown, but two different directions in
which to take his project.
1 Introduction
Harvey Brown’s dynamical relativity has had a considerable impact on the phi-
losophy of spacetime physics since its full articulation in his 2006 book Physical
Relativity: Space-time Structure from a Dynamical Perspective. It rests on deep and
probing questions: what is it about the detailed dynamics of a theory of matter in
spacetime that leads bodies to reflect spacetime structure? Why does the geometry of
general relativity’s metric field have direct operational significance? Brown holds
that the answers to these questions lie in the details of the dynamics: in spe-
cial relativity the key to geometry lies in the Lorentz invariance of the laws; in
general relativity, the strong equivalence principle is essential to the chrono-
geometric significance of the metric.
Many philosophers, myself among them, have found these questions, and
Brown’s answers, provoking and compelling. But while the literature is clear
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on the interest of Brown’s work, it’s less clear on the philosophical upshot:
what exactly are the consequences of Brown’s view for our understanding of
the nature of spacetime itself? Brown himself is more interested in physics than
metaphysics, so interlocutors have often been left to themselves to puzzle out
how his view might be extended to one that takes an explicit position in tradi-
tional debates like that between the substantivalist and the relationist. Many
see strong hints in Brown’s work that he intends to advocate a new form of
relationism. In particular, a focus on the explanatory status of the Minkowski
metric makes many of Brown’s arguments look like attempts to block an ab-
ductive inference to the existence of Minkowski spacetime. For the most part,
both arguments against Brown’s view, and extensions of the view, take this to
be the obvious reading.
But not all aspects of Brown’s book suggest relationism. I’ll argue in what
follows that, while the standard reading makes a great deal of sense when ap-
plied to his statements about Minkowski spacetime, it commits Brown to an
implausible relationism in the case of general relativity. This leaves us with
another option: Brown’s dynamical relativity is best read not as a salvo in the
substantivalism wars, but rather as an account of what counts as spacetime
structure in a given physical theory. Wayne Myrvold argues for just such a
reading in his contribution to this volume; according to Myrvold, Brown is
best seen as giving an analysis of the concept of spacetime, rather than as de-
fending a view about its reality. This seems right to me. In what follows, I’ll
articulate a particular version of this kind of conceptual view that I call space-
time functionalism. Not everything about spacetime functionalism sits easily
with Brown’s arguments, but the view owes a great deal to Brown’s dynamical
relativity, and allows for the application of his ideas to both special and general
relativity, and many more theories besides.
As we’ll see in what follows, there is some tension between the two read-
ings suggested above. Which reading does Brown intend? The simple an-
swer is: neither. Both relationism position based on dynamical relativity, and a
general analysis of the concept of spacetime, are extensions of Brown’s work,
not interpretations of it. Much of what follows will involve reading more into
Brown’s work than his tight focus on the details of relativity requires. But it is
nonetheless instructive, and a testament to the richness of the work, to explore
both extensions and see where they lead us - ultimately to two quite different
places.
In section two, I examine the case advancing a relationist thesis based on
Brown’s work. Not only is this the reading most interlocutors have chosen, but
it makes good sense of Brown’s interest in explanatory issues.
In section three, I consider the trickier case of general relativity, and argue
that relationism based on dynamical relativity here is much less attractive; not
only must relationism about GR be of a different stripe from special relativistic
relationism, but it also relies on the idea that a single field cannot share the
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properties of spacetime and matter, something that is brought into question in
the general relativistic context.
Section four will articulate an alternative to this relationism: spacetime
functionalism. I’ll argue for functionalism about the spacetime concept, and
for a functional role for spacetime that incorporates key insights from Brown’s
work. One virtue of this view is that it plausibly applies to both kinds of rela-
tivity, as well as to other theories.
Section five will examine the relationship between this version of spacetime
functionalism and dynamical relativity. There is no doubt that many of the
arguments made by Brown can be read as supporting this particular breed of
functionalism, if not functionalism more generally. But at the same time, the
position sits uncomfortably with relationist extensions of Brown’s work. The
view itself is neutral on substantivalism and relationism in general, but it can
deliver a substantivalist verdict when applied to a theory with reasonably clear
ontological commitments: general relativity is just such a case.
2 Dynamical Relativity as Relationism
In 2006, Harvey Brown and Oliver Pooley published a paper entitled “Minkowski
space-time: a glorious non-entity”. This paper sets out some of the central ar-
guments that are developed and expanded in Brown’s book.1 The paper, and
the book, argue that one can think of special relativity’s Minkowski spacetime
as a ‘codification’ of the symmetries of matter fields. All that is required for
bodies made of these matter fields to reflect a Minkowskian geometry is that
the fundamental equations be Lorentz covariant. This contrasts with geometry-
first approaches, which take geometry to be ‘prior to’ the dynamics in some
sense,2 and which often come with an implicit or explicit commitment to tak-
ing spacetime geometry to be the structure of a substantival spacetime.
Given this description, and the title of Brown and Pooley’s paper, one might
suppose that dynamical relativity is intended as a form of relationism, albeit
one different from traditional forms. Spacetime structure on this account is
reduced not to relations between bodies, but to symmetries of the laws them-
selves.3
1The themes in this paper, and the book, are also developed elsewhere. See [8, 4, 5, 7].
2Of course, what ‘prior to’ means here is a matter of some debate. If one means ontologi-
cally prior to, one simply assumes a position in the substantivalism/relationism debate without
argument. But if one means explanatorily prior to, one enters into debates about the nature of
explanation which have no clear conclusion. It is in part because of this difficulty that I prefer in
my own work to develop a different strand of Brown’s thought.
3Of course, the metaphysical implications of such a view turn on our account of the laws of
nature. Brown (in conversation, at least) is inclined towards a Humean view, in which case the
laws themselves are reducible the behaviour of material bodies. [19] gives more detail as to how
one can build dynamical relativity on Humean foundations.
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The arguments offered in both the book and the paper seem to support
this reading. One of Brown’s starting points is Einstein’s distinction between
principle and constructive theories. Those who find the distinction instructive
note that members of the former class of theories are, like thermodynamics,
deduced from established empirical principles; they enjoy great empirical sup-
port, but their central postulates go unexplained. Members of the latter class
explain phenomena in terms of the constituents of matter, and thus offer deep
understanding and, perhaps, the hope of metaphysical insight.4 Einstein fa-
mously noted that his 1905 formulation of special relativity was a principle
theory, and therefore, despite enjoying great empirical success, failed to ex-
plain why relativistic phenomena occur. For this, the thought goes, we need a
constructive theory.
Although, prior to Brown’s work, this particular issue had been relatively
little discussed, there is something like an ‘orthodox’ view of the geometry
of spacetime that suggests a response to the problem above.5 It goes along the
following lines: Minkowksi’s 1908 geometrization of special relativity precisely
was the presentation of a constructive account. It explained phenomena like
length contraction by appealing to the geometry of spacetime itself. Balashov
and Janssen make this argument explicitly:
length contraction is explained by showing that two observers who
are in relative motion to one another and therefore use different
sets of space-time axes disagree about which cross-sections of the
‘world-tube’ of a physical system give the length of the system. [3,
p.331]
The idea here is that a phenomenon like length contraction is explained by
appealing to the cross-section of a rod whose invariant description is given in
a four-dimensional Minkowski geometry. The thought is, in part, that space-
time itself forms part of the explanation, and hence the picture is construc-
tive.6 Of course, the fan of spatiotemporal explanation can grant some of
Brown’s agenda: appealing only to spacetime geometry to explain phenom-
ena like length contraction gives, at best, a partial constructive explanation
4There is room, of course, to question whether this distinction is really coherent, especially
when we think of our physics as involving a complex layering of emergent theories with no known
fundamental theory. Brown himself now thinks that this distinction has been something of a dis-
traction in the debates that followed. For a critique of the role that the distinction has played in
this debate, see [17].
5The ’orthodox’ view of spacetime geometry is sufficiently orthodox to have been assumed
rather than argued for and hence has received relatively little explicit defense outside the literature
addressing Brown’s position. One exception is Tim Maudlin’s book on the philosophy of space and
time [15]
6For brevity’s sake, I gloss over distinctions between those who advocate spatiotemporal con-
structive explanation here. Balashov and Janssen do not in fact take their argument to commit
them to the reality of Minkowski spacetime, whereas Maudlin, for example, is fairly explicit in this
commitment.
4
and, at worst, no explanation at all. What is lacking is an account of why par-
ticular matter systems reflect the geometry. But here the fan of a geometrical
constructive theory can appeal to the Lorentz covariance of the fundamental
laws; it’s just that, contra Brown and Pooley, they see these as explained by
the structure of spacetime. Alternatively, (and equivalently), they can appeal
to the generally covariant form of those laws in which the Minkowski metric
appears explicitly.
By contrast, Brown holds that the best explanation for phenomena like
length contraction appeals only to the Lorentz covariance of the laws, which
is a brute, unexplained fact. His argument for this rests on scepticism about
so-called ‘geometrical explanation’:
It is doubtful at best whether the geometries of the configuration
space in classical mechanics, or the space of equilibrium states in
thermodynamics, play the kind of explanatory role that the space-
time interpretation of SR attributes to Minkowski geometry. Why
should space-time geometry be any different? It might be thought
that space and time are somehow more fundamentally physical
than the other space, or more accessible to the senses, or that they
combine to form the arena of physical events. In short that they are
more real. But is not this reasoning question-begging? [6, p.139]
The merits of Brown’s explanatory argument have been much discussed
in the literature;7 I don’t intend to rehash the debate here. Rather, I’d like
to note that Brown’s argument here may be used to block an inference to the
best explanation by the substantivalist. The substantivalist claims that belief
in Minkowski spacetime is warranted by the explanatory utility of Minkowski
spacetime; Brown counters that the explanation in question is obscure or illu-
sory. So Brown certainly intends his position to weigh against the substanti-
valist.
Does Brown’s anti-substantivalism mean that he is proposing a new form
of relationism? Brown rarely uses this language, but his collaborator, Oliver
Pooley, certainly thinks of the view this way; in [19] he lists dynamical relativ-
ity as a form of relationism. And, at least in special relativity, the shape of the
view is easy to see: in Brown’s relationism, spacetime structure is reducible to
facts about the symmetries of the dynamical laws.
7See, for example, [3][13][12][11] or [19].
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3 General Relativity as a Problem Case
In special relativity, then, Brown’s arguments have some force against the sub-
stantivalist, and can be extended to a kind of relationism, albeit one very dif-
ferent from the kind of direct reduction of spacetime to the relations of material
bodies that Mach envisaged. But what of general relativity? Here the reading
is much harder to maintain. What can we make, in the GR context, of the idea
that the geometrical structure of spacetime is reducible to the symmetries of the
matter fields? Not only do matter fields in general relativity not generally have
global symmetries,8 but the geometrical structure of general relativity doesn’t
supervene on any aspect of the non-gravitational fields; the metric field has its
own degrees of freedom.
It goes without saying that Brown, who has a deep understanding of the in-
tricacies of general relativity, knows this perfectly well. Brown’s interpretation
of general relativity diverges from his view on special relativity; he attaches
great significance to features of the former that are not apparent in the latter.
In particular, he points out that the availability of a geodesic theorem for GR
means that GR offers an explanation of inertial behaviour that need not sim-
ply assume a connection between spacetime structure and the movement of
bodies:
Inertia, in GR, is just as much a consequence of the field equations
as gravitational waves. For the first time since Aristotle introduced
the fundamental distinction between natural and forced motions,
inertial motion is part of the dynamics. It is no longer a miracle. [6,
p. 163]
Since the publication of Brown’s book, further aspects of the geodesic the-
orem have come to light. Proving the geodesic theorem requires substantive
assumptions about the matter fields, and similar theorems seems possible for
other theories.9 But Brown’s interest in the geodesic theorem is part and parcel
of a view that pays great attention to those aspects of general relativity that
connect the metric to the behaviour of non-gravitational bodies. The strong
equivalence principle is, by Brown’s lights, absolutely key to the interpretation of
general relativity.
A more far-reaching claim is the strong equivalence principle (SEP),
which will be defined here as follows. There exist in the neigh-
8Of course, depending on what one thinks about the issue of ’substantive general covariance’,
one can always think of the diffeomorphism group as being the symmetry group of GR’s matter
fields, but there’s no question of the metrical structure of GR being inferred from diffeomorphism
invariance.
9See [14] for a discussion of the assumptions behind the geodesic theorem and [22] for a similar
theorem in a Newtonian context.
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bourhood of each event preferred coordinates, each called locally
inertial at that event. For each fundamental non-gravitational inter-
action, to the extent that tidal gravitational effects can be ignored,
the laws governing the interaction find their simplest form in these
coordinates. [6, p.169]
Brown holds that the “chronogeometric significance of the gµν field is not
an intrinsic feature of gravitational dynamics, but earns its spurs by way of the
strong equivalence principle”[6, p.151].10 The central point here is that it is the
fact that gµν defines inertial structure that means that it represents geometry.
This fact is not determined by the mathematical form of gµν but rather by its re-
lationship to the rest of the dynamics. In particular, the minimal and universal
coupling of the matter fields to the metric field means that, in those coordinates
(the Fermi Normal Coordinates) in which the metric diagonalises and the con-
nection coefficients vanish, the laws take a simple and universal form, at least
to the extent that curvature terms do not appear explicitly in the laws them-
selves.11 We shall see in the next section that there is a way of reading this that
suggests a kind of functionalism: the metric field is spacetime because of what
it does (via the strong equivalence principle) and not by way of what it is. But
how might we interpret this kind of claim in a way that is consistent with the
relationist themes in the previous section?
There is, as far as I am aware, just one way to defend the idea that general
relativity is a relationist theory, and that is to insist that the metric field is a mat-
ter field and not spacetime. Carlo Rovelli famously takes this view, illustrating it
with a memorable thought about gravitational waves:
A strong burst of gravitational waves could come from the sky and
knock down the rock of Gibraltar, precisely as a strong burst of elec-
tromagnetic radiation could. Why is the [second] matter and the
[first] space? Why should we regard the second burst as ontolog-
ically different from the first? Clearly the distinction can now be
seen as ill-founded. [21, p.193]
Brown quotes this passage approvingly, and Rovelli’s relationism appears
in some ways to be close to his own position; Brown, for example, warns
against “conflating gµν with spacetime itself”(p.159). But Rovellian relationism
differs significantly from the kind of dynamical relationism discussed above in
the case of special relativity. In the special relativistic case, the geometry of
spacetime reduced to symmetries of the dynamics. In this case, the geometry
10In recent work with Dennis Lehmkuhl and James Read, [20] Brown endorses this message, but
notes that there are considerable subtleties here once one acknowledges that, even in the presence
of minimal coupling, dynamical equations in GR do not always take their special relativistic form
in freely falling coordinates.
11See [20] for detailed discussion of minimal coupling and its consequences for higher order
equations.
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of spacetime is given by a single matter field, which represents the geometry
only because of its role in the dynamics. Although the two positions share a
commitment to relationism and an interest in the importance of dynamics to
geometry, there is no straightforward sense in which the position in special
relativity simply carries over to the general relativistic case.12
If this were the only issue, Rovellian relationism might nonetheless be de-
fensible; it’s hardly surprising that the move to GR should bring with it a
change in one’s view of spacetime metaphysics. But the proposed relation-
ism for GR is much less attractive than Brown’s dynamical relationism in the
case of special relativity. In the earlier case, one could read Brown as arguing
for eliminativism with respect to the Minkowski metric. In the GR case, space-
time geometry is now held to be instantiated by a matter field. But this only
has force against the substantivalist if one also assumes that something with
the characteristics of a matter field cannot also be spacetime. One finds no ar-
gument in Brown’s work, or in the work of others, for such a position. Indeed,
Brown’s emphasis on the chronogeometric significance of the metric means
that his account explains in detail exactly how the metric comes to represent
spatiotemporal quantities.
Given all of this, it may be worth seeing Brown’s endorsement of Rovelli
in a different light: when Brown emphasises the matter-like properties of the
metric field, he is interested in highlighting the sense in which this field, in the
absence of its relation to other fields, does not possess any intrinsically spa-
tiotemporal characteristics. This sets the scene for an account which explains
just why, given the dynamics of general relativity, this field is in fact spacetime.
And this argument points not to the reduction of spacetime to a matter field
and hence to a form of relationism, but to an explanation of just why and how
it is that general relativity is a theory of spacetime. The next two sections will
explore these ideas in more detail.
4 Spacetime Functionalism
This section will describe an alternative way to think about the interpretation
of spacetime theories: spacetime functionalism. I’ll advocate a version of the
position that incorporates several of Brown’s insights, although I’ll leave it to
the next section to fully flesh out the relation between this position and Brown’s
own.
Spacetime functionalism, as the name suggests, describes any position that
takes spacetime, spacetime regions, or spatiotemporal relations to be picked
out by their functional role. Spacetime functionalisms of various kinds might
12Oliver Pooley also makes this point when discussing the merits of Brown’s relationism in GR
[19, p.578].
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have some things in common: for example, they promise to help to make sense
of theories of quantum gravity in which spacetime is emergent; it is relatively
straightforward to make sense of the idea that functionalized objects or prop-
erties may be non-fundamental. They also share a certain ability to cut across
old substantivalist/relationist distinctions. But beyond this, positions might13
vary widely. There is little more to be said until one has picked out the kind
of functionalism one has in mind; one must say exactly what is being func-
tionalized, and what the functional role is. One may then approach the task
of working out what plays the functional role; in the kind of functionalism I
have in mind, the results of this process will then further depend on the theory
under consideration.
I’ll argue here for a functionalism about the spacetime concept that ties space-
time to a certain role within a broader theory. But one might instead, for exam-
ple, hold that spatiotemporal regions are functionally picked out by the causal
role that they play. Alyssa Ney [18] and David Albert [1][2] defend a position
like this in the context of space in quantum mechanics; they think that space
can be recovered from wavefunction realism (in 3N-dimensional configuration
space) via a functional characterization of spatial regions. David Chalmers [9]
advocates a kind of functionalism about spatiotemporal relations aimed at re-
covering the content of our experiences.
These strains of functionalism differ markedly from the kind of spacetime
functionalism I advocate here. For one thing, I’m interested in recovering theo-
retical spacetime structure, rather than phenomenological space (although one
would expect there to be a relation between the two). My functionalism instead
involves the claim that spacetime is a functional concept. A structure that plays
the spacetime role in a theory just is spacetime; once one has analysed the role
and understood what fills it, there are no further questions to be asked about
the ‘real’ spacetime structure. Spacetime is spacetime by virtue of what it does,
not what it is. In his entry in this volume, Wayne Myrvold notes
...that a full-blown defense of [Brown’s] view requires considera-
tions of a sort that are very much out of fashion in the contemporary
philosophical landscape. These involve considerations of the way
that our concepts - in this case, spacetime concepts - gain purchase
on the physical world.[16]
My view involves just this kind of unfashionable conceptual consideration.
This kind of concept functionalism is defended in broad strokes by the kind
of consideration that Myrvold appeals to: what else could spacetime be? If our
13I say ’might’ because the literature on spacetime functionalism is in its infancy; the phrase
appears very little outside of my work. Nevertheless, there’s an obvious reading that takes it to
denote a position wider than my own.
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conceptual grasp on spacetime is not exhausted by the role it plays in our the-
ory, what might the extra ingredient be? As Myrvold notes, those who favour
a stronger flavour of metaphysics may insist that a functional role fails to cap-
ture the metaphysical role played by spacetime: that of a container or stage. But
I agree with Myrvold that any non-metaphorical content of this claim disap-
pears when we strip away the functional role of spacetime. Intuitions about
spacetime’s container nature either boil down to thoughts about the kind of
functional role that spacetime plays, or to obviously false ideas about preferred
reference frames and inapt comparisons to familiar spatial containers.
There is another brand of opponent to be defended against: those who think
that identifying spacetime structure is a simple matter of looking for objects
with a certain mathematical structure. Here, arguments given in Brown’s book
help us to see off the challenge.14 As the passage quoted on p.4 of this paper
attests, Brown [6, ch. 8] describes a number of examples of physically useful
geometries that are not spatiotemporal,among them velocity spaces, projec-
tive Hilbert spaces and the phase space of thermodynamics. Geometry is a
flexible tool; with so many non-spatiotemporal uses of geometry there is no
question that mere geometrical form could be a sufficient condition for repre-
senting spacetime. But nor can we plausibly give any necessary geometrical
conditions for spacetime; the geometries of Newtonian and relativistic theories
are diverse enough to leave little common ground for such a criterion. And in-
sisting that, for example, spacetime can only be represented by a rank 2 metric
tensor not only rules out the spacetimes of past theories (spacetime in Newto-
nian theories is not represented by a single tensor), but unhelpfully restricts
future theorizing as well.
If there are no plausible non-functional ingredients in the spacetime con-
cept, then we should be spacetime functionalists. Might we simply stop there?
There’s a long and illustrious history in philosophy of committing to function-
alism without articulating the functional role under consideration. But in this
case, much of the usefulness of spacetime functionalism comes in its applica-
tion to individual theories; the idea here is, in part, that spacetime function-
alism will allow us to pick out spacetime structure in theories where there is
some debate or ambiguity. In order to do this, we need to be explicit about the
functional role. I propose that the spacetime role is played by whatever defines
a structure of local inertial frames. I’ll say a bit more about this, and about the
definition of an inertial frame shortly, but, first, let’s look at the considerations
in play when thinking about the role that spacetime plays.
Much of Brown’s work is directly relevant to the question of defining a
role for spacetime structure. In particular, two key themes emerge from his
book that can serve as desiderata when seeking a concise way of expressing
the spacetime role. First, Brown is concerned with the operational significance
14Brown does not use these examples for the same purpose I do here; instead he’s concerned
with the explanatory status of spacetime geometry.
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of the spacetime metric; the spacetime role had better ensure that the behaviour
of rods, clocks, light rays and test particles appropriately (if not exactly) reflects
the metric structure. Second, and relatedly, he notes that ensuring such opera-
tional significance is a matter of dynamics.
Brown’s own account is aimed at establishing the ‘chronogeometric sig-
nificance’ of the metric: he is silent on the subject of whether any objet with
chronogeometric significance must be spatiotemporal. But we may take his
account and apply to the concept of spacetime itself: in order for any struc-
ture or object to count as spacetime, it had better be related in the right kind
of way to the behaviour of physical systems (and particularly to those physi-
cal systems that measure spatiotemporal variables); securing this relation will
involve postulating an appropriate connection to the dynamics. What kind of
connection to the dynamics? At the very least, the spacetime role had better
be such that the symmetries of the dynamical laws match the symmetries of
the structure that we take to be spacetime. This idea falls out of Brown and
Pooley’s thoughts about the importance of Lorentz covariance in ensuring ap-
propriate behaviour of clocks and rods, but it of course it also has an older
provenance. The idea that spacetime symmetries and dynamical symmetries
must be appropriately coordinated is sometimes called the Earman p rescription
because it is particularly clearly expressed in John Earman’s 1989 book [10,
p.46]. Given its methodological importance in spacetime foundations, what-
ever role we assign to spacetime ought to imply the Earman Prescription.
Might we simply conjoin the considerations above in order to come up with
a suitable functional role? Perhaps; I have no doubt that there is more than one
way to pick out the role played by spacetime in existing theories. Good for-
mulations might agree on our standard spacetime theories, but need not agree
in their attributions of spacetime structure to all theories; in my view disagree-
ments over the interpretation of spacetime theories should precisely turn on
disagreements over the functional role. But a cobbled together conjunctive
definition seems undesirable. We would ideally like a formulation that en-
tails appropriate phenomenological behaviour without requiring us to model
the behaviour of complex systems. In addition, application of the Earman pre-
scription is, in fact, not possible unless we first understand which variables
are spatiotemporal: there are some symmetries of the dynamics, such as the
gauge symmetry of the vector potential in electromagnetism, that we take to
be unrelated to spacetime structure and not subject to the Earman prescription.
We sometimes say that the prescription applies only to external symmetries,
such as the symmetries of relativistic dynamics under lorentz transformations,
and not to internal symmetries like the aforementioned electromagnetic gauge
symmetry. Arguably, identifying the external symmetries of the dynamics re-
quires a prior handle on spacetime structure.
So we should look for some simpler way of expressing the functional role
that nonetheless ensures an appropriate link to the dynamics, including the
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external dynamical symmetries. Here, Brown’s work once again rides to the
rescue. Recall Brown’s formulation of the strong equivalence principle:
There exist in the neighbourhood of each event preferred coordi-
nates, each called locally inertial at that event. For each funda-
mental non-gravitational interaction, to the extent that tidal grav-
itational effects can be ignored, the laws governing the interaction
find their simplest form in these coordinates. [6, p.169]
According to Brown, the fact that the metric couples to the matter fields
in such a way as to make this principle true is the key to its chronogeometric
significance. But in a functionalist setting, we can take this further, and say
that the metric is spacetime precisely because it plays this role in our theory.
By defining a structure of local inertial frames in the way described by the
strong equivalence principle, the metric succeeds in filling the desiderata set
for spacetime in the discussion above: the local coupling ensures that the local
symmetries of the dynamics coincide with the local symmetries of the metric,
and hence ensure that the metric governs the behaviour of rods and clocks
which obey those dynamical laws. Given that both the Minkowski metric and
the affine structure of Newtonian theories serve to define a structure of inertial
frames, the definition seems to have wide-ranging applicability. Moreover, in
relativistic theories, inertial structure fixes projective and conformal structure,
and hence metrical structure15so the definition does justice to the full geomet-
rical significance of the theory.
Let us say then, that spacetime is whatever serves to define a structure of
inertial frames, where inertial frames are those in whose coordinates the laws
governing interactions16 take a simple form (that is universal insofar as curva-
ture may be ignored), and with respect to which free bodies move with con-
stant velocity.
There is, of course, much packed in here to the notion of ‘a simple form’.
As previously mentioned, and discussed in [20], simplest form here need not
mean special relativistic form. Some higher order equations may involved cur-
vature terms even in their simplest form, which is why we can only claim that
the form of such equations is universal to the extent to which curvature terms
may be ignored. But this does not mean that the notion of a ‘simplest form’ is
contentless: first order equations will take their special relativistic form in in-
15Projective and conformal structure in fact only fix the metric up to a global scale factor. But
there is no need for this kind of conceptual functional definition to pick out every feature of the
metric field. In addition, the empirical significance of a global scale factor in relativistic theories is
far from clear.
16In the case of general relativity, one might specify that this applies to the non-gravitational
interactions, but there’s a sense in which this isn’t necessary, if we take interactions to be associated
with the fundamental forces. Once we acknowledge the spatiotemporal status of the metric field,
gravity no longer classifies as an interaction in the relevant sense.
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ertial frames, and higher order equations involving curvature terms will take a
poincare´ invariant form in these frames.
This gives us a ‘thick’ definition of an inertial frame that builds in a connec-
tion to the dynamics, and to the dynamical symmetries, as well as to a notion
of natural motion that has historically been central to ideas about space and
time. It thus captures the concept of spacetime used in contemporary theories
well. Concepts are slippery things, however, and prone to changing over time.
It’s been suggested to me, both by Wayne Myrvold and by Harvey Brown that I
should appeal to a thinner definition and only talk about inertial motion rather
than inertial frames, or perhaps only about natural motion. Such a move would
allow more things to come under the umbrella of my functionalist definition;
Myrvold, in particular, is concerned about the status of Aristotelian theories.
According to my analysis, inasmuch as Aristotelian theories lack inertial struc-
ture, they lack spacetime structure.
But there are costs as well as benefits to a thinner definition. Much of my
work on functionalist themes involves putting this criterion to use to solve
apparent underdetermination problems; I’ve argued elsewhere [citations re-
moved for blind review] that, although both Newtonian gravitation and telepar-
allel gravity are usually formulated in such a way that their explicit geometry
is flat, both really involve a curved spacetime. These arguments depend on the
idea that the explicit flat connection in these theories fails to define full inertial
structure. But only a sufficiently rich notion of inertial structure can play this
role. If spacetime structure only requires defining natural motions, then by re-
defining which class of bodies we take to be force free, we can easily generate
alternative spacetime structures. But describing force laws that couple to the
new geometry in an appropriate way is a much trickier business; the thick no-
tion of inertial structure mentioned here is capable of blocking conventionalist
moves.
5 Dynamical Relativity as Spacetime Functionalism
Much more needs to be said in defense of the position above, but my main pur-
pose here is to understand the connection between these ideas and Brown’s
own. As a matter of intellectual history, the kind of spacetime functionalism
I advocate owes a deep debt to Brown’s work. It arose directly from my at-
tempt to square the cogency and interest of the kinds of questions that Brown
asks with the conviction that general relativity was a substantivalist theory in a
fairly straightforward way. And the debt, of course, goes deeper than just read-
ing Brown’s work: not only did Harvey teach me most of what I know about
the foundations of spacetime, but it was Harvey who prompted me to think
about teleparallel gravity, the theory that first made me think that identifying
spacetime structure might involve more than looking at the explicit geometri-
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cal form of a theory. Given the importance of the inspiration, one might won-
der whether my version of spacetime functionalism just is Brown’s dynamical
relativity read in a certain way.
It is clear, of course, that Brown does not think of his theory as giving a
breed of functionalism. The word ‘function’ appears in his book primarily in
its mathematical sense, and explicit discussion of the nature of the concept of
spacetime is not Brown’s style. Moreover, some things that could go under
the title of spacetime functionalism are anathema to Brown; he’s unlikely to
engage in debates about the metaphysical status of spatiotemporal relations in
the context of wavefunction realism anytime soon. Furthermore, the scope of
Brown’s project is different from that of the functionalist. Brown is concerned
to interpret relativistic theories; the functionalist is concerned to provide and
analysis of spacetime that might apply much more broadly across both pre and
post-relativistic theories.
But, despite these explicit differences, it should be clear from the previ-
ous section that the kind of spacetime functionalism proposed rests crucially
on arguments made by Brown; the idea that all there is to being a spacetime
is playing a role in defining inertial structure is right there in quotes like the
following:
...it is of course non-trivial that inertia can be given a geometrical
description, and this is connected with the fact that the behaviour
of force-free bodies is universal: it does not depend on their consti-
tution... It is more natural in SR to consider the 4-connection as a
codification of certain key aspects of the behaviour of particles and
fields. [6, p.142]
or
It is because of minimal coupling and local Lorentz covariance that
rods and clocks, built out the matter fields which display that sym-
metry, behave as if they were reading aspects of the metric field and
in doing so confer on this field a geometric meaning.[6, p.176]
Like the spacetime functionalist, Brown sees his position as being helpful
for the emergence of spacetime in theories of quantum gravity:
... the notion that the gµν field is the fabric of space-time, rather than
a field in space-time, may be misleading. It may serve to hinder
recognition of the possibility that Einstein gravity is an emergent
phenomenon...[7, p.9]
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But despite having much in common with the spacetime functionalism de-
scribed above, the first part of this quote reminds us of the difference between
the views. For the spacetime functionalist, the gµν field is spacetime. Given
that, from a realist perspective, and considering GR as a fundamental theory,17
gµν is undoubtedly a real field, and neither reducible nor eliminable, the view
is committed to the idea that spacetime is part of GR’s ontology.
By my lights this makes the spacetime functionalist a substantivalist with
respect to general relativity. This is because I take any theory in which space-
time is part of the fundamental ontology to be a substantivalist one. This is,
of course, ‘substantivalism-lite’; it is substantivalism stripped of the contain-
ment metaphor. But the containment metaphor’s content was always illusory;
simple realism about spacetime provides the only defensible substantivalism.
Myrvold, I think, disagrees; he claims that the conceptual view (of which
spacetime functionalism is a variant) is neither relationist nor substantival-
ist. This seems to me right in the case of special relativity; the functionalist
thinks that spacetime is a ‘thing’ just in case a ‘thing’ fills the spacetime role.
In special relativity, there is an independent debate to be had about whether
the Minkowski metric is a ‘thing’, or is reducible to something else. Brown-
style relationism is a live option for the functionalist here; it may be that the
structure that plays the spacetime role is nomological.18
But again, in the case of GR, I fail to see how belief in a real field that is
spacetime is not belief in a real spacetime. And here, there is a tension be-
tween those parts of Brown’s work that appear to endorse Rovellian relation-
ism and the functionalism proposed. For Brown, gµν spatiotemporal issue is
not the main point; as noted earlier, Brown is silent on the issues of whether
a field with chronogreometric significance is therefore spacetime. Moreover,
even if Brown’s position falls short of Rovellian relationism, Brown is certainly
anti-substantivalist, and the spacetime functionalism in discussion here im-
plies substantivalism in the case of general relativity.
It is possible here that we could interpret Brown as having a thicker con-
ception of substantivalism than the functionalist; in the quote above, he insists
that gµν is not the fabric of spacetime. Myrvold also denies that the term ‘sub-
stantivalism’ should be applied to any realist conception of spacetime. It may
be that Brown assumes that any belief in the reality of space brings with it the
baggage of substantivalist container metaphors. If this were the case, his anti-
substantivalism, if not his GR relationism, might be very much in line with
17Acknowledging that GR is almost certainly an emergent theory muddies the water here. I am
inclined to think it makes sense to be an emergentist and a substantivalist about spacetime in a
certain sense, because I think emergent entities should be admitted to our ontology. Others will
disagree.
18Myrvold also seems to think that what I am calling ‘Brown-style relationism’ here isn’t really
relationism, because if we’re not Humean about laws, then symmetries of the laws aren’t reducible
to facts about actual matter.
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functionalist concerns.
But it is hard to see this disagreement as entirely semantic. As Myrvold
also notes, a reading of Brown that emphasises the analysis of the spacetime
concept is in tension with Brown’s interest in questions about spatiotemporal
explanation. If spacetime just is inertial structure, then the fact that spacetime
reflects relevant symmetries of the dynamics is an analytic truth. It makes no
sense to ask whether one explains the other. The spacetime functionalist here
should agree with Pablo Acun˜a [17] that Lorentz covariance and Minkowski
structure are two sides of the same coin, and the analytic connection between
them does not allow for sensible arguments about the arrow of explanation.
In short, a functionalist reading of Brown requires us to ignore parts of the
project, namely exactly the features described in section two that have tradi-
tionally supported a relationist reading of his work. At the same time, the idea
that spacetime is conceptually intertwined with inertial structure, an idea at
the heart of the functionalism described above, is inherited very much from
Brown’s work.
6 Conclusions
How can we square these two extensions of Brown’s work? I am not sure that
we need try to render them compatible. The considerations advanced here,
alongside those raised Myrvold and Acuna, reflect an increasing awareness
that there are two strands present in Brown’s work. On the one hand, Brown
advances arguments for an interesting and novel form of relationism in special
relativity. On the other, he develops a subtle picture of the spacetime concept,
one in which claims about spacetime are tied intimately to claims about inertial
structure. It is increasingly clear that a great deal can be gained by disentan-
gling these two very different contributions to the foundations of spacetime
theories. The second strand lays the groundwork for an analysis of the con-
cept of spacetime itself, and it is on this groundwork that a kind of spacetime
functionalism may be built.
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